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Public Participation in Resolving Environmental
Disputes and the Problem of
Representativeness*
Peter T. Allen**

Introduction
This paper reviews the role of public participation in environmental
dispute resolution and highlights the problem of representativeness.
There is a growing interest in issues associated with such participation
and some history of various attempts to implement it. Experience of
the modern world suggests any number of odd occurrences that might
fit the category of "environmental dispute" but concern has tended to
center on those sorts of issues that fall approximately into the broad
category of planning decisions. Where to locate facilities, the so-called
"siting problem", is probably the most familiar of these sorts of
disputes, though more general planning decisions also exemplify the
types of conflict situations which give us pause.
In the examination of cases for empirical study in a current research
project, a considerable range of situations emerged about which people
might become exercised. What has been repeatedly found by research
in this field is that people appear to be concerned with having an
adequate voice in making decisions which affects their locality, well
beyond what might be seen as the rather limited outlook of the socalled NIMBY 1 view; given the rather more charming acronym of
LULU 2 in the U.S. 3 Indeed so significant is this aspect of the
situation that it may be the most important element in the formation
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and/or the escalation of a dispute and, thus, would need to be
addressed if we are to have better decisions.
The degree to which people may have an input into such decisions
will obviously vary with the nature of their local polity and with the
traditions of decision making in their society. Therefore, international
variation in the circumstances of public participation is to be expected
and, consequently, there is more than passing usefulness in the lessons
that might be learned from comparison of the different experiences in
different countries. Beyond such particularities there are, of course, the
commonalities that might be identified when making comparisons
between situations. In fact it seems that sufficient experience in
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures demonstrate that
taking stock is a real possibility. Certainly initial review indicates a
catalogue of pros and cons that make interesting reading.
The main context that reveals the nature of the problem is the
history of decisions and decision-making institutions. In general,
European experience appears somewhat different from that in the U.S.,
with less attempts at participation in cases being recorded in the former.
In any event, issues of the openness of information and the
unresponsiveness of institutions take on significance in most cases.
While the problems which dominate effective practice are not
necessarily hard to understand because they involve issues of power,
they may well be hard to resolve. However, where we cannot resolve
problems quickly, we can at least explore methods.
Categories of Methods
One key way in which methods differ is in the extent of public
involvement and influence which they permit. For example, in their
advice to government agencies, some utilize the concept of a "ladder of
participation". 4 This maps the increase in participation from naked
government power up to citizen power, where people take actions
without reference to government. It could be argued, for example, that
the degree of influence varies from very little in traditional systems of
consultation and objection, to rather more implied in the setting up of
4 Billie Jo Hance et al., Environmental Communication Research Program,
Improving Dialogue with Communities: A Risk Communication Manual for
Government, Report to New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection (1998).
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panels or Community Fora, to a considerable amount expected from
the use of formalized quasi-legal mediation.
In general, the following presentation of procedures mirrors the sort
of evolution that has occurred in the body of theoretical literature
concerned with disputes and their resolution. From initial concerns with
solving conflicts, and models for achieving such ends which were based
on normative principles, research into mismatches between human
actions and theoretical prescriptions has gradually turned towards
actual processes and procedures for the management of disputes. A
social psychological approach has emerged which explores conflict as a
social process and is thus more concerned with "what happens" than
with the content of the dispute, or "what it is about". There seem to be
three generic phases: exploration of the problem; structuring of the
problem and evaluation of options. These divisions are reflected in the
various approaches outlined below.
Consultation is perhaps the weakest practice within the general
category of participation. As what might be seen as a first step toward
including the public in decision-making, consultation has some
advantages over the implementation of an otherwise remote decisionmaking authority. If members of the general public are included in a
consultation exercise, such as a round table discussion, they are in turn
able to communicate what they have learned from the process to their
peers and members of their special interest groups. Communications
seem to be improved between authorities and the public.
However, there are drawbacks. The most obvious is that decision
prerogatives remain firmly with authorities. The relative transparency of
this relation may or may not be a factor in a given situation, but popular
mechanisms for consultation may make things more confrontational by
5
amplifying community responses. Public forums may increase anger.
McComas argues that "if the organizers of public meetings are
perceived as having hidden agendas or as simply giving "lip service" to
the citizens attending the meetings, the outcome may be more, rather
than less, frustration and concern about the issues."6
5

Katherine A. McComas & Clifford W. Scherer, Risk Perceptions of Participants

at Public Meetings: The Potentialfor Risk Amplification, Paper Presented to the
Society for Risk Analysis, Annual Meeting, Dec. 8, 1996.
6 Id.
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This appears to be an argument for better structured consultations.
Further problems may arise when those included in the consultation
process find themselves operating as mediators between the authorities
and their own interest groups. Paradoxically, this effect is likely to be
even greater if the procedure is relatively well structured, such as in the
case of an official "round table." Those who are the leaders of the
((opposition" or "special interest" groups may well find themselves being
seen as compromised by their special position. Any suggestion that the
proposed consultation process will involve more than the mere "hearing
of views" may be sufficient to warn group leaders that compromise is
possible. In highly charged situations, just talking to the opposition
constitutes a political weakening because it legitimizes the dialogue.
Where consultation might be chiefly characterized as a
communications approach, the procedures involving mediation go
further to include arrangements for the negotiation of outcomes based
on the prior negotiation of suitable process. 7 If disputing parties can
have access to an agreed neutral mediator, then a competent decision
may emerge. Of course, any such decision can only be the product of
those groups that are party to the mediation procedure. Given the
above remarks about the compromising of positions where there is
strong opposition, the mediation procedure will lack validity in the eyes
of the excluded groups whether that exclusion is self imposed or not.
Most likely the public, by which is meant everyone except those
organized into, or represented by, special lobby groups, will be outside
the loop of mediation.
Full blown attempts at participation comprise a family of
techniques that all attempt to include people the general public in some
interactive process. That process may be focused, for instance, on the
early planning stages of an environmental development or on the
resolution of a particular dispute.
The first sort of attempt in this category comprise mediated
workshops, such as Zukunftswerkstatt in Germany. Here the aim is to
generate ideas with the assistance of expert opinion that can lead to
7 Laurence S. Bacow & Michael Wheeler, Envtl. Dispute Resolution (1984); Gail
Bingham, Resolving Envd. Disputes: A Decade of Experience (1986); Environmental.
Mediation: The Search for Consensus (1980); Sally E. Merry, Varieties of Mediation
Performance: Replicating Differences in Access to Justice, Access to Justice 1 (A.
Hutchinson ed., 1990).
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development proposals or planning criteria. In use, such a procedure
seems best suited to community self-development activities. A further
step towards participation in dispute resolution is represented by the
Planning Cell, which is a more developed approach that brings together
lay people in a sort of parallel planning procedure. 8 Such panels are
known as Community Advisory Fora in the United Kingdom (U.K.).
Community Advisory Fora vary in format but are generally composed
of selected representatives of stakeholder groups who are brought
together on a number of occasions to learn about and discuss planning
issues. They are asked to formulate recommendations, based on their
viewpoints and to inform a particular policy. They have been used
successfully in the U.K. by the Hampshire County Council to inform
9
local household waste management strategy.
Lay preferences are thus imported into the decision process, again as
a sort of advanced consultation, in which planning problems are
rehearsed and solutions developed which might subsequently gain
wider support in the community. A similar sort of procedure
characterises Regional Urban Design Assistance Teams, originating in
the U.S. and also recently imported to the U.K. These teams provide
professional planning assistance for local community organizations,
enabling the latter to move from the position of opposing proposals to
10
the development of their own alternative schemes.
Perhaps more developed are Citizen Juries, in which structured
presentations are followed by deliberations on the part of a jury of lay
people. The jury then publishes recommendations to the decisionmaking body.1 1 In one proposed and developed implementation, the
8 Peter C. Dienel, Die Planungszelle. Eine Alternative zur
Establishmentdemokratie (1992); Peter C. Dienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A
Gate to "Fractal" Mediation, in Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation:
Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse 117 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995).
9 Judith Petts, Hampshire County Council Integrated Waste Management
Strategy Community Consultation and Involvement: A Case Study, A Report for

the Dept. of Trade and Industy, No. ETSU B/EW/00389/23/REP (1994); Judith

Petts, Waste Management Strategy Development: A Case Study of Community
Involvement and Consensus-Building in Hampshire, 38 Journal of Envtl. Planning
and Mgmt. 19 (1995).
10 1. Haywood, Why Planfor Public Participation?,50 Housing and Planning Rev.
6 (1995).
11 Ned Crosby et al., Citizen Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation,46
Pub. Admin. Rev. 170 (1986); Ned Crosby, Citizen Juries: One Solution for
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planning jury is part of a three-step procedure of public
participation. 12 In the first two steps, the key issues and concerns
about a proposed facility or site are identified and transformed into
indicators to produce a "performance profile" for the facility.
Randomly selected groups of citizens are formed into planning juries
and are presented with technical evidence and key arguments for and
against the proposed siting. The juries then evaluate the facility on the
13
basis of the evidence and their own value judgements.
The main difference between these juries and Community Advisory
Fora or Planning Cells is that the juries are comprised of randomly
selected citizens and not of representatives of stakeholder groups. This
may be a key benefit of the method and could mean that there will be
less chance of participants having vested interests and more chance of
resolving conflicts and reaching a consensus. 14 In effect, planning jury
participants are given the chance to mediate between polarised groups
and the disproportionate influence of pressure groups is avoided. This
method was used to assist in the development of national energy policy
in Germany where the juries were used to elicit public preferences with
respect to four energy policy options. 1 5
Probably the most recent systematic treatment of these approaches
is the Co-operative Discourse Model. 1 6 This model is a response to
the shortcomings uncovered in implementations of the various methods
thus far. Briefly, what is attempted is a matching of the participation
processes to the stages that a complex decision may need to go
through. There are three such stages identified: value criteria may be
brought together through processes involving mediation; confirmation
of the facts of the case may be assembled using an expert workshop or
Difficult Environmental Questions, Fairness and Competence in Citizen
Participation-Evaluating Models for Envtl. Discourse 157 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds.,
1995).
12 Ortwin Renn et al., Public Participation in Decision Making: A Three-Step
Procedure,26 Policy Sci. 189 (1993).
13 Id.
14 Ortwin Renn et al., An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences Among
Four Energy Scenarios, 26 Tech. Forecasting and Soc. Change 11 (1984).
15 Ralph L. Keeney et al., Structuring West Germany's Energy Objectives, 15
Energy Policy 147 (1987).
16 Renn et al., supra note 12.

Allen: The Problem of Representativeness 303

so-called Group Delphi; and assessment of options may be achieved by,
17
for example, Planning Cells.
Summarizing Benefits and Problems
The hope of public participation is that any process which involves
the public is that it will produce a "better" outcome; a slightly broader
term than "decision". The point is that local input may, or may not,
appear to be especially useful in a specific case. A technically based
decision may seem entirely sufficient. However, often enough,
decisions taken without public involvement may be sub-optimal because
of factors which cannot be present in an expert evaluation, such as
subsequent anger and distrust. 1 8 Preventing or reducing extreme
reactions thus seems to be a benefit of early public involvement. In fact,
several suggested benefits that Citizen's Advisory Groups could offer
actually seem to apply to any participation method because such
methods:
1. provide a cross sampling of public views and concerns;
2. give citizens a chance to become informed about an issue
before coming to a conclusion;
3. lead to deeper understanding of the concerns and views
of others with the effect of moderating extreme views;
4. serve as a communication link to people in the
community;
5. build consensus among conflicting groups.1 9
For all of these reasons increased public participation should
increase the efficiency of the planning process, at least to the extent that
plans are more likely to be accepted by the public. However, there may
also be drawbacks:
Legitimacy ofNon-Expert Input
The advisory board which reviewed the project reported by Renn,
et al., 2 0 argued that the so-called citizen panels were not particularly
valuable elements of the planning process. 2 1 The arguments centered
17 Thomas Webler et al., The Group Delphi: A Novel Attempt at Reducing
Uncertainty, 39 Tech. Forecasting and Soc. Change 253 (1991).
18 Billie Jo Hance, supra note 4.
19 James Creighton, Dept. of Energy, Guidelines for Establishing Citizen's
Advisory Groups (1993).
20 Renn et al., supra note 12.
21 Helmut Jungermann et al. eds., Die Analyse der Sozialvertraglichkeitfur
Technologiepolitik: Perspecktiven und Interpretationen, Munich: HTV Edition
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around the purported inability of the public to understand complex
data and their lack of experience. In an earlier study in the U.K. of the
potential for incorporation of public values into siting decisions for
hazardous plant, it was found that local authority planners believed
non-expert locals had insufficient technical expertise to provide any
22
useful input.

Accountability
One review of "Community Advisory Committees" observed that
the degree of influence of groups was varied and that, often, formal
mechanisms to ensure accountability were not in place. 2 3 Linked to
this is the issue that, if participants are not accountable, they will often
reach conclusions or make decisions which are not financially or
24
physically feasible. Other studies have drawn similar conclusions.
Legitimacy of Group
There is no necessary assurance that the public will accept an
"advisory group" to speak on its behalf. Furthermore, advisory groups'
may become elitist, or otherwise lose touch with constituencies, thus
increasing the likelihood that the general public will not support any
recommendations.
Representativeness
This is a key problem identified by many commentators. For
example, one study defined the main criterion for success of
Community Advisory Committee exercise as the incorporation of the
views of a fully representative cross-section of the community into a
development plan. 2 5 To this end, every effort was made to obtain a
Technik und Sozialer Wandel (1986).

22 Peter T. Allen & Louise O'Hara, Siting Decisions Concerning Hazardous
Chemical Sites: A Social-Psychological Approach, in Fourth European Congress of
Psychology 302 (Alexandra Hantzi & Maria Solman eds., 1995); Peter T. Allen et al.,
Measuring and Using Public Values in Decisions on the Siting of Hazardous
Installations, EC Report for Contract EV5V-CT92-0071 (1995); L. O'Hara & Peter
T. Allen, The Divergence Between Experts and Lay People: Knowledge, Concerns
and Values with Regard to Hazardous Chemical Sites, Risk Analysis and

Management in a Global Economy, SRA Europe; Proceedings of the 1995
Conference at 202 (1997); Renn, supra note 12.
23 Frances M. Lynn & G. J. Busenberg, Citizen Advisory Committees and
Environmental Policy: What We Know, Whats Left to Discover, 15 RiskAnal. 147
(1995).
24

O'Hara, supra note 22.
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representative sample. However, despite best efforts, the panel selected
was better educated and had a higher average income than that of the
26
general population.
The Problem of Representativeness
Part of this problem is the complexity that arises from the
confusion of meanings elicited by the idea. While it appears that a clear
conceptual distinction can be made between "representativeness" and
"representation", the two meanings overlap in practice. From the point
of view of social science, the problem of representativeness might be
characterized as one similar to sampling. That is certainly the meaning
in the example quoted above, and the explicit reasoning behind an
27
approach that seeks to avoid participants having vested interests.
From the perspective of the neutral observer, "representativeness" seems
to be about the selection of participants, but the notion of
representation does not necessarily imply demographic identity. In
liberal democracies the "representatives" need not be a microcosm of
the constituencies that they represent, although problems do arise when
disparities between the characteristics of representatives and their
constituencies become evident. Some degree of parity is usually viewed
as appropriate so that, for example, there may be calls for a group of
government representatives to include people from ethnic or other
minorities.
However, there are other aspects underlying the problem. While
one clearly relates to the faithfulness of representatives to their
constituency, two other issues are of importance. The first concerns the
consequences of having an approximate demographic match for any of
the procedures reviewed above and the second concerns the reasons for
the appearance of "unrepresentative" groups. When it comes to the
selection of participants in any procedure, those with power are likely to
employ a discourse about the procedure which legitimizes their own
position of opposition to change. Typically, this discourse contains two
characteristic responses which relate to the above issues: the "expert
25 L. Kathlene & J. A. Martin, Enhancing Citizen Participation: Panel Designs,
Perspectives, and Policy Formation, 10 J. of Pol'yAnal. and Mgmt. 46 (1991).
26 Id.
27
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versus non-expert opinion" debate on the one hand, and the "apathetic
public" argument on the other. If a group of representatives actually
reflects the general population then it is very unlikely that it will include
relevant technical expertise. In contrast, if a group appears to consist of
people with special interests, rather than a reflection of the local
population, it may be taken to indicate a lack of concern on the part of
that population.
With respect to the expert opinion element, it has been found that
the most popular argument against the use of techniques to incorporate
public values in planning decisions is that the public were incapable of
making informed judgements about what was said to be a technical
subject. 2 8 It is worth noting that these arguments obviously have some
validity in the context of the technical evaluation aspects of certain
proposals, and that this has been well recognized in attempts to produce
more comprehensive participation procedures. 2 9 The point is that this
sort of assertion seems to primarily be an argument against the whole
notion of incorporating public input. However, because it attempts to
set the agenda for appropriate decisions within the technical realm, it
achieves its end while appearing to be about qualification for suitable
input. Indeed, in this view, a representative sample, in the demographic
sense, would almost entirely consist of unsuitable people.
The second element in the partisan discourse of the technocrat is
more interesting. While this assertion commonly appears to be
mobilized in defence of inactivity on the part of those making planning
decisions, for example, as part of an argument about the limited
usefulness of information provision, it does seem to hinder attempts at
adequate participation overall. Clearly, the existence of disputes proves
that the public is not completely apathetic but the argument does raise
the issue of representativeness in a different form. When a structured
process is put in place, the decision makers may attempt to get
"demographic" type representation. However, as was noted above, they
often fail. Furthermore, in most cases the dispute process gets
underway with those people who present themselves. Thus one research
question becomes: When people do come forward to pursue a dispute,
how representative of the public are they?
28 O'Hara, supra note 22.
29 Renn et al., supra note 12.

Allen: The Problem of Representativeness 307

McComas and Scherer, in their work on participation in public
meetings, characterized the public in terms of activity levels with
respect to given disputes. 3 0 In the "pyramid model" of public
participation, a highly active but small number of policy elite are
followed by a somewhat larger number of active people ("attentives"),
and then a much larger number of residual non-attentive people. The
boundaries between such groups are argued to be fluid, with people
becoming more or less active depending on the stake positions in which
they find themselves. Such seems to- be the approximate empirical
distribution in most examples of public involvement. The issue of
similarity or difference among those groups is less clear. McComas and
Scherer report differences but note that others have found broad
31
similarity among the groups.
One reference might be to examples from the literature on
industrial negotiation. Here, the situation has at least one direct parallel:
the great mass of people privy to a dispute are not particularly active in
the conduct of the negotiations, formal or informal, but tend to rely on
the local activists who call meetings, disseminate information and
generally speak out against employers. Yet, in such cases, it would seem
improbable that most people were indifferent to the possible outcomes
of disputes. More likely is the interpretation that group leaders are seen
as representatives of the mass of employees. Indeed, analyses of
industrial disputes have charted the ways in which ad hoc "leaders" are
deposed when the mood of the majority is thwarted by developments.
It seems probable that most people rely on visible activists most of the
time for the voicing of group concerns. One U.K. case, for example,
reports finding considerable sympathy for Eco-warrior activists involved
in the dispute. 3 2 Thus, a simple interpretation of representation in
proportional demographic terms does not match the reality revealed in
the social processes of disputes.
30 McComas, supra note 5 (taking basic approach from J. D. Miller, Scientific
Literacy: A Conceptual and EmpiricalReview, 112 Daedalus 29 (1983); J. D. Miller,
Reaching the Attentive and Interested Publics for Science, in Scientists and Journalists:
Reporting Science as News 55 (S. M. Friedman et al. eds.,1986)).
31 Kathleen G. Gundry. & Thomas A. Heberlein, Do Public Meetings Represent
the Public?, J. Am. Planning Ass'n. 175 (Spring 1984).
32 Maria Simosi & Peter Allen, in this issue.
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Another study discusses the legitimacy of links between delegates
and mandates as a relation of identity. 3 3 When local authority
representatives volunteer only legally-compelled information, they are
blamed for violating a moral obligation to respond to constituents'
need for information. This blaming, it is argued, demonstrates that
people have internalized a normative ideal stressing that representative
democracy is about the identity relationship between political
representatives and citizens. 3 4 This implies that political representatives
should not contribute to impositing a risk on the least well-off of their
constituency. People may be happy to remain silent themselves if
spokespersons, empowered to speak in their name, maintain identity
with conferred mandates. 3 5 The public do not necessarily strive
initially for participation but may when representatives seem to stray.
The social process, at least as far as it can be traced in the context of
large scale and long lasting disputes, is one in which public sympathies
are more or less efficiently reflected in the activities of the few and
where the issue of representativeness shades into concerns over
legitimacy. On the scale of individual disputes, the loss of trust and
perceived legitimacy of activists on the part of the wider public mirrors
the loss of trust in established institutions for decision-making. It comes
about for similar reasons and reminds us that prescriptions for action in
the social sphere are often thwarted by developments; what politicians
cynically refer to as "events". It is also reminiscent of the useful
distinction that is made between global and local concerns. In the
general evolution of democracy in Western nations, the issues to be
addressed by representatives are assumed to cover the whole likely or
eventual range of issues within the defined jurisdiction. However, with
increasing frequency, other specific systems are called for by a public
concerned that their general political representatives are not sufficient to
the task.

33 Catherine Zwetkoff, A Proposal for an Analytical Framework for Siting
Conflicts, in Development and Evaluation of Procedures for the Resolution of
Environmental Disputes, EC Report for Contract ENV-CT96-0270 (1997).
34
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